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As the Army transforms to meet Department of Defense goals in support of the National Security Strategy's preemptive options, it must maintain a military force that can "conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results." 1 Guard as military forces available for national service. 3 In that same year, the Army National
Guard was called to active duty as individuals instead of units for service on the Mexican
Border, a possible precursor to an IRR concept. 4 The National Defense Authorization Act of Reserve Corps. 5 At the time of the enactment of the Act, there were 4,000,000 men in an unorganized trained manpower pool of discharged veterans. 6 The Armed Forces Reserve Act of July 9, 1952 The bureaucratic documentation required to implement this action would overwhelm the system.
An alternative would be to process these soldiers under the same criteria as a soldier who is absent without leave. After 30 days, the derelict soldier should be dropped from the rolls and processed for separation under other than honorable or a bad conduct discharge.
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Soldiers who fail to meet minimal education requirements within an allotted period of time can also be involuntarily transferred to the IRR control group. If they fail to satisfactorily complete initial active duty training, by law, they cannot be deployed overseas. 33 As of January 2003, there were 4,926 personnel who had not completed initial training. 34 Given the limited training funds available to the IRR control group and the lack of initiative on the part of the individual to complete the training, these soldiers should also be discharged from the service.
Other categories of substandard performance include soldiers who fail to meet Army body fat standards, those involuntarily relieved from drill sergeant duty, and soldiers reported as a "no show" to their assigned unit. There are 519 personnel in the IRR control group for character of service and 7,239 personnel for suspension of favorable actions (Bar to Reenlistment). 35 If the soldiers fail to meet their membership responsibilities in other manpower categories, they will likely fail to meet their membership responsibilities in the IRR control group. Past behavior is a good indication of future behavior.
SUSTAINMENT OF THE IRR MANPOWER POOL
Given the sources of the IRR manpower, it is understandable that sustainment of this pool Unfortunately, their performance is normally discovered during a mobilization, when it is too late to make changes and fix deficiencies. Table   2 reflects the enlisted high demand skills sets. 37 Over 80% of the soldiers within these skills sets are in the RT36+ category. Since it has been over three years since these soldiers have operated or trained in the skill set, there is a high probability their skills have degraded to the point of being non-operational without significant refresher training. 38 It would cost the Army $18.6 million dollars annually to conduct the two-week refresher training just to maintain these high demand skills. However, due to skill degradation, many of the soldiers within the RT36+ and pre-deployment, refresher, and certification training of IRR personnel. 41 In the event of a mobilization, IRR personnel will receive active duty orders directing them to a reception station located in the Continental United States (CONUS). Once soldiers arrive at the reception station, they will be accessed onto active duty and receive training in basic soldier skills. This process takes about ten days. The soldier is then sent to a schoolhouse to assess degradation of skills and identify refresher training, as needed. This process could take less than three weeks or more than six months, depending on the level of degradation. The degree of training base expansion is defined by the training requirement and the current peacetime training load.
During peacetime, the IRR Control Group (Annual Training) has an annual training requirement, but historically this is not strictly enforced. Soldiers can voluntarily request attachment to a unit for the purpose of training or participation in training exercises. HRC-St.
Louis approves these training events based on available funding. The funding for this program is drawn from the same IRR readiness training account used for the two-week refresher training; 43 The number of personnel supporting the OIF mission alone was nearly half of the required personnel for ODS, and the initial unit shortfall and casualty projections for OIF were 11,000 soldiers. However, the senior civilian defense leaders decided not to involuntarily call-up the IRR manpower pool. The Services were directed to acquire casualty and unit filler personnel from Active and Reserve units. The senior civilian defense leaders felt the Services did not adequately inform IRR personnel of their mobilization responsibilities prior to the onset of conflict and thus IRR soldiers would not be adequately prepared, both personally and professionally, for the recall to active duty.
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IRR Mobilization Planning and Processing
In addition to the lack of control on the size of the IRR population, there is no documented force structure to assign personnel transferring to the IRR control group. The Army G-1 uses The Army built overstructure into the force to provide a more flexible warfighting capability.
FIGURE 1. MOBILIZATION MANNING PROCESS
This overstructure resulted in the majority of units maintaining an ALO 3 or 4 status, which equates to 75-80% authorized strength compared to required strength. This concept assumes that pre-trained individual manpower accounts can be used to bring units back up to ALO 1 prior to deployment. Indeed the concept assumes: 1) the IRR manpower accounts are readily accessible; and 2) the skill sets within the IRR will meet the unit filler requirements.
Given the constrained access to the IRR, the current status of available IRR personnel, and the accelerated deployment timelines, the Army is re-evaluating the overstructure concept.
The Army Reserve and Army National Guard are already proposing changes in the Total Army Analysis 11 to remove reliance on the overstructure and align requirements with authorizations.
The Active Army is also reviewing the overstructure issue and will either propose an increase in Army end strength to bring units to ALO 1, thereby building rotational depth to meet future requirements, or remove the overstructure and re-align requirements with authorizations to brings units to ALO 1. As previously mentioned, the Army Reserve is currently testing the viability of a TTHS account. If properly managed, non-MOS qualified Reserve soldiers will be assigned to the TTHS account instead of occupying a valid authorized position within a Reserve unit. This affords the Unit Commander the ability to fill the position with a qualified soldier thereby improving the unit's overall personnel readiness.
Given the restructuring efforts by the Army, there could be less reliance on the pre-trained individual manpower pool to fill unit shortfalls. The only other IRR manpower requirements would be to fill the casualty shelf requirements. With increased technology in precision munitions, individual protective armor, medical life saving techniques, and automated tracking systems such as "blue force" tracking 47 , the casualty estimates have dwindled, so casualties can, potentially, be replaced through the peacetime accessioning pipeline.
Operational Employment
In support of Operation Desert Storm, call-up of the IRR was executed using the MOBMAN, MOBARPRINT, and MOBPERS data systems explained above. The success of the connectivity between the systems facilitated the call-up of 19,000 IRR personnel to meet shortfall requirements. In support of Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, the connectivity between the systems was disrupted by the Army's senior civilian leadership to approve only IRR volunteers by-name. 48 The IRR acquisition system was not prepared for this sudden policy shift. Previous administrations approved the specific operational requirement for IRR personnel and the Army G-1 directed the mobilization of IRR personnel to meet operational requirements. This process was automated to expedite notification to the soldier. The new process created delays in notification, and required additional funding to reprogram the computer software to accept a "by-name" approval process. This delay caused
Active and Reserve units to be deployed at less then their authorized deployment levels.
In Soldiers desiring to stay beyond their initial enlistments should do so according to the needs of the Service. Given current skill shortages, soldiers should be directed to reclassify and participate in reclassification training to gain effectiveness within a new skill set.
As the Army Reserve builds a TTHS account, several categories of personnel (transients and trainees) will no longer be transferred to the IRR control group, thus reducing the size of this account. If the Army revises current regulations to prevent substandard performers from being transferred to the IRR control group, this will also reduce the size of the account. If the soldiers do not meet membership responsibilities in the Selected Reserve, they will most assuredly not meet the membership requirements in the IRR control group. These soldiers should be discharged under the appropriate service conditions (e.g., honorable, other than honorable or general discharge)
For soldiers who fail to abide by the law and maintain a current address on file, HRC-St.
Louis should take steps to process individuals for dereliction to report, much the same way soldiers are processed for Absent Without Leave (AWOL). IRR soldiers have a responsibility to maintain a current address on file as part of their service obligation, much like a soldier on active status has the responsibility to report to duty. Policies and procedures should be developed whereby the IRR soldier would be dropped from the rolls after a specified period of time and processed for separation under less than honorable conditions or general discharge.
The Service expends too much energy and funding to track down these individuals. To put more bite in the policy, soldiers in this status could be reported to the local law enforcement authorities. The next time the individual is stopped by the authorities, they could be detained and transported to the nearest Army facility for processing, just like Active Duty soldiers who are AWOL.
Given the current restrictions on recall of individuals with less than 24 months since departing from active service (RT24), the Army should consider a change to the contractual obligations if this current policy becomes future doctrine. The soldier should be required to fulfill the remaining service obligation in the Selected Reserve, 50 thereby gaining access based on unit call up. It does not seem practical to contractually obligate soldiers to serve a two-year period in the IRR if there is no intent to recall the soldier.
Under the direction of the Chief, Army Reserve, the Selected Reserve is undergoing a structural transformation which includes the development of a rotational base. 51 The IRR program can play a significant role in that rotational base if it maintains a manning document that identifies the capabilities or skill sets required to meet operational demands. This can be accomplished through an annual MOBMAN analysis of approved operational war plans translated into "force structure" requirements. IRR personnel can then be slotted against those validated requirements on a manning document. The fill rate against the requirements could be used as a measure of overall readiness of the program. In view of the dwindling IRR manpower pool, critical shortages in many key skill sets, and the recently experienced obstacles to IRR call-up, continued reliance on the IRR as a viable basis for Army mobilization manning plans and doctrine may not be prudent. 52 With the Army's proposed ALO changes and the recommendations and analysis provided in this research project, the IRR could be eliminated within the next 6-10 years. If the Department is not willing to invest in this category of personnel, then it should take the necessary steps to eliminate the program. The current IRR system provides only a false sense of security that does not support the transformation initiative or future operational requirements. However, given the current operational requirements supporting a protracted limited war, the Department may need to reinvest in this pool in the interim -but with controlled management policies, formalized structure, legislative changes, and metrics designed to measure success. By re-establishing management controls, the Army can demonstrate to the senior Department of Defense civilian leadership that this manpower pool is protected and well managed to meet the future and shortterm national security requirements.
WORD COUNT= 6, 196 48 Army G-1 could not involuntary mobilize an IRR soldier who departed from active service within the previous two years nor could they involuntary mobilize an IRR soldier who was mobilized within the last two years unless the Service implemented a Stop Loss policy across the Service within that skill. 50 Assigned to a reserve unit or as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee. 51 Rotational base is defined as the development of sufficient authorized and sourced force structure within a particular skills set or unit mission capability that reduces the number of deployments, or rotations, for any given individual or unit over a long period of time. This provides operational depth within a skills set or unit mission capability.
